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CASE ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT HIGH-SPEED VESSEL 
PROGRAM: DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
ABSTRACT 
In response to a shifting National Military Strategy that renewed the focus of 
combat operations on smaller, projectable, and dynamic joint fight entities, both the 
Army and Navy reviewed requirements to address capability shortfalls in either their 
force structure or operational warfighting concepts, or both. Both services’ initial 
capability reviews resulted in a series of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations 
(ACTD) designed to explore the military utility of converted commercial, high-speed, 
shallow-draft vessels as a materiel solution.  
This case study investigates the use of the ACTD to support the requirements 
generation and validation processes, the extent to which Army transformational and 
mobility factors drove the requirements process, whether or not changes in logistic 
support plans for Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV) impacted Army mission 
capabilities, and ultimately if these considerations led to a successful joint service 
acquisition of the JHSV. For both services, the ACTD supported the requirements 
process but it also presented new challenges in the approach to a joint materiel 
solution that would satisfy operational needs. That approach prioritized, validated, 
and incorporated competing operational requirements into a final and unique materiel 
solution for a system capability that is fielded. 
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The Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV) program started as an Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) that explored the military use of commercially 
produced high-speed catamarans originally designed and used to ferry cars and supplies 
in the region around Australia. 
The original ACTD experimented with High-Speed Vessel (HSV) X1, named 
Joint Venture, specifically because of its subsequent use by the Army and Navy as a 
demonstration of an existing commercial technology to be converted for military use. 
During the Navy lease period, HSV Joint Venture was used as a command and control 
vessel for five other vessels that comprised a mine warfare readiness group. HSV Joint 
Venture was fitted with a helicopter landing pad on its aft end and it supported Navy 
special operations missions as well. During the Army lease period of HSV Joint Venture, 
logistical experiments and military combat operations were executed from the Persian 
Gulf in direct support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
The success of the initial experiments with HSV Joint Venture provided the proof 
of principle for leaders of both services. As a result, three additional vessel leases for 
technology demonstrations were initiated. First, the Army leased the Theater Support 
Vessel (TSV) named Spearhead, for logistical, tactical, and special operations missions. 
Second, the Navy’s lease of HSV Swift was used to further demonstrate capabilities for 
mine sweeping and mine clearing support operations. Third, the Marine Corps chartered 
the Westpac Express, another high-speed catamaran, to use as a high-speed connector to 
demonstrate sea base-to-sea base and sea base-to-shore movement of personnel and 
supplies. 
TSV Spearhead was the Army lease that further investigated Army sustainment 
and operational combat capabilities. It was used in a combat support role for Operation 
Enduring Freedom and demonstrated its utility in support and sustainment operations 
specifically related to the Army’s Title 10 water transport role. 
 xvi 
The Navy and Marine Corps experiments focused on the conduct of missions in 
support of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 Vision, which consisted of three distinct 
components: Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing (Clark, 2002). One of those 
components most relevant to JHSV, Sea Basing, establishes and utilizes seaborne 
platforms from which the Navy/Marine Corps can stage and project combat power. As a 
key component of the Navy Sea Basing concept, the Marine Corps leased Westpac 
Express to demonstrate principles pertaining to troop movements between power 
projection platforms. HSV Swift, the Navy’s second leased vessel, was used to 
demonstrate its principal role in the Sea Power 21 Concept—a vision that included force 
protection, mine countermeasures, general fleet support, and humanitarian partnership 
missions. 
The successful experiments and technology demonstrations that took place over a 
period of years provided valuable insight into the use of high-speed vessels for both 
tactical and logistical missions for both services. As a result, the Army campaign to 
reorganize and restructure its force to brigade-centric fighting entities became a priority 
effort directly linked to the HSV and the Army’s quest to adapt its ability to project 
warfighting power and upgrade its watercraft fleet. Department of Defense (DOD) 
directives under statutes in the U.S. Title 10 law require the Army to provide logistics 
support over the shore in joint operations using its organic watercraft fleet (Joint Chief of 
Staff, 2000). However, given a slow and aging Army watercraft fleet, the use of high-
speed vessels became a key essential element of the transformation process. 
The multiple experiments that supported both Navy and Army requirements 
challenged the joint requirements development process as the services fought through a 
myriad of differences in mission focus, priorities, institutional service prejudices, and 
defense acquisition processes. Multiple disagreements between key materiel developers, 
evaluators, and integrated logistics representatives of the services became points of 
contention that were eventually resolved, but not easily and not without intervention from 
higher echelons of either or both services. Although the joint requirements process 
provided the framework necessary for each of the services’ leadership to express and 
address concerns regarding the final materiel solution, ACTDs for high-speed vessels 
 xvii 
spanned nearly five years before the JHSV, known today as the Spearhead-class 
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Threats to United States interests and security identified in defense planning 
documents were influenced by the former GWOT and the asymmetric threats it presented 
both here in the U.S. and abroad. For this reason, the nature of warfare made it necessary 
to modify the force structure and strategy. Such changes also required changes to 
instruments of war. Modifications in the nation’s security posture were conveyed through 
legislation and the National Security Strategy, warranting adjustments in the focus on the 
strategic and operational levels of war. The National Security Strategy of 2006 drove the 
National Defense Strategy, which in turn, drove the National Military Strategy and the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) priorities. These planning and guidance 
documents warranted an increased priority for enhancing joint operations capabilities for 
the Army, in particular. 
Likewise, President Barack Obama’s January 2012 memorandum, which 
identifies our strategic interest and guides our defense priorities over the next 10 years, 
shifts our attention to the security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific. The letter further 
ensures that our military is “agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies” 
(Department of Defense, 2012, p. 2).   
The subsequent strategic guidance communicated by the Secretary of Defense in 
his January 2012 memorandum articulates and reflects the President’s strategic direction 
to the DOD. It specifically states the need for a “joint force of the future that will be 
smaller and leaner, but agile and flexible, ready and technologically advanced. Such force 
will have a global presence emphasizing the Asia Pacific and Middle East while 
maintaining commitments to Europe” (Department of Defense, 2012, p. 5). These two 
documents form the basis of a national strategy and JHSV would become an integral part 
of that strategy. 
The key CJCS priorities derived from the National Military Strategy were as 
follows: “(1) win the war on terrorism, (2) enhance joint warfighting, and (3) transform 
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the force” (Rouse, 2006, p. 8). Subsets of the third priority required development of new 
force employment capabilities, the integration of new warfighting capabilities, and 
leveraging research and development efforts. The Army and Navy actions embraced 
these priorities by their decision to proceed with a high-speed vessel as a materiel 
solution. Four vessels would eventually be used by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to 
determine the necessity for a materiel solution that would become the JHSV program. 
The technology demonstration of high-speed, shallow-draft catamarans started 
with a joint venture between the Army and the Navy. During a one-year lease of a high-
speed vessel, the Navy had control of the vessel for the first period, and the Army had 
control of the same vessel for the second portion of the technology demonstration period. 
The Navy focused on minesweeping operations using HSV Joint Venture as a command 
and control vessel for a mine warfare readiness group. Results of its use and versatility in 
this role would later prompt another, more comprehensive Navy experiment. The Army’s 
use of HSV Joint Venture was used to support actual special operations in the beginning 
of the Gulf War and also as proof of principle for other logistics-oriented operations. 
For the Navy, the conceptual uses of the experimental HSV focused on a full 
spectrum of mission capabilities that included humanitarian support, use as a medical 
support facility (MSF), antiterrorism force protection to include maritime intercept 
operations, homeland security, noncombatant evacuation operations abroad, combat 
logistics support, minesweeping operations, and most importantly, power projection 
operations (Department of the Navy, 2005). As a multi-faceted and agile platform, JHSV 
provides both services with a unique capability from which task organized combat 
entities can project and employ power in a wide range of the operational contingencies 
referred to in the President’s memo outlining strategic directions. Figure 1 is a computer-
generated depiction of the experimental HSV (TSV Working Integrated Program Team 
[WIPT], 2005) showing a representative tasked organized configuration designed to 
execute missions of a specific mission profile.  
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Figure 1.  U.S. Navy HSV Concept. Source: TSV WIPT (2005). 
In addition to these missions, the Chief of Naval Operations published Sea Power 
21, a vision document for the Navy in 2002, which provided a more deliberate focus on 
the Navy’s intent to transform its organization and strategy for naval warfare to one 
centered on increased agility and power projection. The Sea Power 21 Concept involved 
three components: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing (Clark, 2002). According to the 
United States Department of the Navy (2005), experimental HSV, named JHSV after 
becoming a joint program, would serve as the linchpin that connects and operates all 
three Sea Power components. The JHSV would serve as the link or high-speed connector 
that moves between seaborne platforms. The use of the JHSV as a component of 
minesweeping defense operations supports the Sea Shield component. Finally, the JHSV 
would be used to impose its might through the use of combat force firepower in the Sea 
Strike component of the Sea Power triad. These concepts represented the transformation 
that would fulfill the Navy’s enduring challenge to provide strategic deterrence by 
projecting agile, sustainable power that controls the seas. The transformation triggered a 
requirements review, and the review revealed the necessity for a developmental program 
of high-speed, shallow draft vessels (Department of the Navy, 2005). In the development 
of the program, the Naval Warfare Development Command (2002) adopted the vision 
taking steps to incorporate the principle uses of JHSV in to the materiel solution. 
Likewise, operational imperatives linked to joint operations and the Army’s role 
in supporting the National Military Strategy, merited a change in the Army force 
structure eventually supported by the merits of the ACTD. This experiment with 
commercially designed high-speed, aluminum-hull, shallow-draft catamarans revealed 
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that the vessels could be converted for military use and significantly increase the 
effectiveness of both combat and logistically oriented Army capabilities to meet national 
defense strategy objectives at the tactical and operational levels. In their commercial 
capacity, the high-speed vessels were used in Australia to ferry people, cars, and other 
materials together. 
With due consideration to how high-speed, shallow-draft vessels were being used 
commercially in Australia, the Army sought to experiment with the vessel and 
demonstrate a proof of principle for its use as an agile instrument to build, sustain, and 
employ combat power. These functions of building, sustaining, and employing military 
activity are intertwined depending on mission objective(s). 
In its current structure, Army plans and capabilities for building combat power 
dictate a separation of Soldiers from their equipment as part of the process for the 
deployment and employment of combat forces. Imagine the planning and coordination 
challenges of having to marry Soldiers with their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, field 
artillery pieces, air defense systems, shop vans, cargo trucks, towed trailers, 
communications equipment, large generators, and other essential combat supplies while 
under observation or threat of attack. 
The TSV would alleviate some of those concerns and facilitate military action 
planning by playing a critical role in the conduct of the Reception, Staging, Onward 
Movement and Integration (RSOI) operation, which is a combat-building function with 
logistic implications (Department of the Army, 1996). RSOI is a phased operation in 
which combat power is built through a series of successive, and sometime concurrent, 
events as a component of power projection. Typically, equipment and supplies are loaded 
upon ships or already on prepositioned ships and sent to a sea port of debarkation 
(SPOD). In the reception phase, units of Soldiers are then typically flown to the airport of 
debarkation, and in some cases subsequently bussed to the SPOD in a theater of 
operations and eventually married with their equipment. The equipment is then unloaded, 
readied, and reconfigured for combat as part of the staging phase of the operation. This 
could be the most difficult and time-consuming part of the operation, which could also be 
subjected to a degree of risk and vulnerability for friendly forces. Often concurrent with 
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the staging phase is the onward movement phase, where forces are marshalled and 
integrated or organized for battle as combat entities for combat operations. Depending 
upon the size and magnitude of the operation, which is also dependent on the access, 
number, and size of the ports, and number of transportation assets such as aircraft, ships, 
trucks, and trains, the RSOI process can take several days, weeks, or even months. 
As another means of conducting RSOI operations or providing sustainment 
support operations, the Army has the Title 10 responsibility to provide and conduct 
Logistics over the Shore (LOTS). A LOTS operation conducts off-shore or in-the-stream 
discharge of personnel, equipment, and/or supplies often due to denied access to sea port 
facilities because of space or political challenges, shallow waters not accessible by deep 
draft ocean-going vessels, or when the port simply lacks sufficient infrastructure to 
support port discharge operations. LOTS is an Army responsibility that entails the use of 
resources such as floating causeways, port handling equipment, and a fleet of large and 
small (lighterage) vessels used as landing craft. 
The sea state or conditions that affect sea swells and wave heights often hinder 
LOTS operations. When a roll-on, roll-off discharge facility, which is a floating pier, or a 
causeway cannot be established, small landing craft, referred to as lighterage, are used for 
loading or unloading ships and transporting their equipment or supplies between points at 
sea and ashore. Lighterage craft, such as the Besson Class Logistic Support Vessels, 
typically travel at speeds upward of 12 knots (Spearhead-Class Expeditionary Fast 
Transport, 2016), a relatively slow speed in comparison to the JHSV’s ability to travel at 
speeds up to 40 knots, depending on load weight and sea state. 
Given this mission requirement and a slow and aging Army watercraft fleet, 
senior logisticians, particularly of the Army Transportation Corps, sought to experiment 
with the TSV and justify its use and means to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
logistic sustainment operations as well. Experiments with the 7th Transportation Group 
(Composite), based at Fort Eustis, Virginia, demonstrated the vessel’s ability to connect 
with the causeways and transfer equipment as part of a LOTS operation. 
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Army Maneuver and Fire Effects (MFE) personnel, formerly combat arms 
personnel, also sought to prove out the TSV’s use as a means to employ combat power in 
a theater since it could operate at sustained speeds exceeding 35 knots. As part of the 
Army’s second experiment, the TSV was outfitted with a robust Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
architecture, which permits it to accurately navigate worldwide using Global Positioning 
Systems. This system can also recognize friendly and enemy elements on and above the 
water’s surface, exchange intelligence via secure voice and data transmissions, integrate 
operations in the joint and combined operations environments, and conduct combat 
planning on the move. The capability of this communications suite, coupled with the 
sheer speed of the vessel and its carrying capacity, would provide a combatant 
commander with an unparalleled and unprecedented capability to maneuver and sustain 
combat forces over great distances with a high degree of agility (speed), depth, and 
versatility—all key tenets of war.   
The technology demonstrations revealed proof of principle that entire combat 
entities such as a mechanized infantry company, field artillery battery, or any other 
support unit(s) could be task organized and be employed with a high degree of efficiency 
to previously denied, austere, or unimproved ports. From the Army tactical maneuver and 
fires perspective, the C4ISR suite was one of the two critical attributes supporting the 
rationale for the TSV as a materiel solution. The second most compelling argument for 
adding JHVS came as the result of challenges, revealed in the initial Mobility 
Requirements Study (MRS) of 1992 and a subsequent Mobility Requirements Study 
Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) of 1995 which was primarily focused on 
intertheater lift capabilities. As a follow-on to the MRS BURU, another study and 
analysis that was focused on intratheater mobility was conducted and reported by GAO 
how lift capabilities for intratheater lift could be enhanced to add value (General 
Accounting Office [GAO], 1998). That report’s findings coupled with yet another MRS 
study in 2005 refined mobility requirements (Jasmin, 2002) and eventually influenced 
programmatic decisions in favor of the JHSV. 
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The latter MRS study commissioned by the Joint Chiefs and reported by GAO in 
1998, revealed shortcomings in lift capabilities while also confirming a necessity to 
delineate service requirements for operational level intratheater maneuver and support as 
mandated by law and DOD instructions. Shortfalls in capabilities became priority 
requirements, particularly for the Army and its need to quickly find a materiel solution to 
complement the restructuring of the Army warfighting organization. To do so quickly, 
taking advantage of technological advances and/or existing commercial solutions had to 
be leveraged. 
This study (GAO, 1998) and subsequent papers (Crowley, 2004) also discussed 
and examined the extent to which high-speed vessels could reduce or mitigate the 
shortcomings in the Army’s specific mobility requirements, given the ongoing 
transformation of its force structure. To that end, high-speed, shallow-draft vessels 
redesigned for combat or logistics-oriented missions, warranted joint consideration as a 
materiel solution. Equally important was that solution’s subsequent ability to meet 
requirements for both services, although the requirements differed dramatically in some 
aspects. 
With regard to the Army transformation of the force to lighter, more lethal, 
projectable combat entities, (Department of the Army, 2004) innovative methods of 
deployment and employment became absolute imperatives. At one point, IPT discussions 
indicated that the direction of the Army’s evolving role crossed into the expeditionary 
role like that of the Marine Corps. Perhaps in a joint environment, where redundant 
capabilities are acceptable, this would not be a problem. Despite the relatively minor 
discussion of the Army expeditionary role, a compelling debate began to form in the 
Army between logisticians and tactical maneuver and fires-oriented leaders (formerly 
referred to as tacticians or those in the combat arms branches). That debate and its 
outcomes also drove the establishment of intraservice priorities. 
From the logistician’s perspective, the vessel was important because it offered a 
viable solution to resolve or alleviate the problems associated with an archaic fleet of 
watercraft approaching the end of its useful economic life. Some logisticians, 
transportation officers like myself at the time, viewed the JHSV as a giant step in the 
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right direction of controlling, by a more effective means, their flexibility to conduct 
seaborne logistics at a much faster pace and with greater lift capacities. This position is 
reflected in the briefing that espoused use of the JHSV as an integral part of the Army 
Watercraft Fleet (USATC, 2002a). This was imperative, given the Army force structure 
that changed from a large, powerful, and fixed division-centric organization to a smaller, 
self-contained, self-sufficient, lethal, and projectable brigade-centric organization. The 
intent of the high-speed vessel program was intended to complement the transformation. 
For both services, speed was the common denominator and true key attribute that 
drove the requirement for the JHSV. Speed to deploy and employ forces of sufficient size 
to coastal access points, and speed to provide more lift capacity over time were the most 
critical elements of the JHSV’s added value to all services. 
These factors were a paramount concern and weighed heavily in the development 
of Army requirements that originated in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
and Charter for the TSV ACTD. At the inception of this idea for a military experiment or 
technology development involving high-speed, aluminum-hull catamarans, the gap that 
existed for intratheater sealift and airlift in 1995 remained problematic prior to and after 
the 2006 National Security Strategy was published. The TSV ORD was used to provide a 
framework for the ACTD program to establish performance and operational parameters 
(Department of the Army, 2003a). 
The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is a phased process that investigates whether 
or not modifications to existing capabilities or other alternatives such as commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) or developmental materiel solutions meet a need or fill a capability gap. 
In this case, JHSV is a combination of a COTS item modified for military use. The 
Army-Navy ACTD for HSV Joint Venture was intended to accelerate that process with 
both services originally exploring the use of a commercial option to meet a military 
requirement. Spinoff ACTDs from the original Army-Navy joint program venture were 
launched by the Army (TSV Spearhead), Navy (HSV Swift), and Marine Corps High-
Speed Connector. These experiments that investigated and determined military utility 
were important to providing vital information for the final requirements determination 
and materiel solution that is fielded today. Research and information contained in this 
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project report indicates that the joint service requirements process was a continuous one, 
if not because of revised defense acquisition processes, then by an absolute necessity to 
compromise and establish competing priorities that would meet the needs of two services. 
The Navy and Marine Corps experiments revealed a number of viable solutions 
and other key considerations for the conduct of both minesweeping and Navy logistics 
missions. Based on a series of continuous experiments conducted with high speed vessels 
over a period of at least two years, both services are assumed to have found reasonably 
promising results of the original and subsequent ACTDs. As a result, the JHSV program 
became a joint acquisition program between the Army and Navy, with the Navy 
designated as the lead service. After some coordination between the services that 
included some fundamental changes in the logistic support structure and life cycle 
management concept, the acquisition program became the JHSV program. Even well into 
the development and initial production of the first vessel, other significant programmatic 
changes were made regarding the operation and manning of what is now called the 
Spearhead-class EPF vessel. 
The terms “TSV,” “HSV,” and “JHSV” refer to the same type platform used at 
different times prior to and leading up to the formal designation as a program of record. 
Where possible, JHSV will be used throughout the remainder of the document to avoid 
confusion with the platforms discussed. 
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question is: Did use of the ACTD and its support of the 
requirements generation and validation process facilitate a successful joint service 
acquisition? 
The purpose of this research project is to examine how the ACTD and other 
individual service factors impacted the requirements process and ultimately drove the 
development and resolution of a unique materiel solution for a joint acquisition program. 
JHSV started as a technology demonstration of one materiel solution for multiple joint 
and individual service capabilities. The research describes the catalysts for change, 
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individual service and joint challenges and the actions that were necessary to make JHSV 
a successful joint acquisition program. Research is shaped by the following:  
• A shift in the National Military Strategy; corresponding changes to CJCS 
priorities. 
• Army and Navy force reorganizations. 
• Joint mobility requirements; Army intraservice capabilities of its 
watercraft fleet. 
• Individual and joint acquisition policy.  
Through this process, lessons learned will be identified to serve as a reference to 
other acquisition managers or test and evaluation (T&E) personnel facing similar 
challenges in joint programs. 
With the requirements process as the focal point of this applied project, this paper 
will examine the initial requirements and then the evolution and prioritization of those 
requirements by different service processes. This paper is weighted toward Army 
operational considerations as it pertains to generating requirements to execute designated 
mission sets and the associated logistics implications. 
The following secondary research questions shape the outline and body of 
information that support the objectives. 
• How did the requirements process impact or influence defense acquisition 
of the JHSV from program inception to delivery/fielding? 
• Were the Army transformational and mobility factors sufficient to drive 
the requirements process that warranted a material solution such as JHSV? 
• How did changes in logistic and support plans for JHSV impact the 
system’s mission capabilities for the Army? 
C. SCOPE 
This research project is intended to analyze the requirements processes for a joint 
program with two services undergoing transformations of both force structure and 
strategy in support of the national defense. Its scope will include aspects related to 
military utility of a COTS design for increased mobility, force projection of a 
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transformed force structure, factors related to deployment/employment timelines, and 
other logistical implications. 
“Mobility” is a term used interchangeably with “power projection”—a key 
component of the National Military Strategy and the extent to which experimental high-
speed vessels, such as the commercially converted TSV, serve as the potential materiel 
solution. This study also reports the impact of the Army organizational changes based on 
its transformation to the modular brigade combat teams with organic combat service 
support units. To a lesser extent, the program study considers costs in terms of 
manpower, funding, and time, mostly for the Army. 
Background materials were obtained from TSV ACTD program reports, 
coordination and support to action officers of Product Management Office for Army 
Watercraft, personal experiences with Army and Navy officials prior to commencing this 
joint applied project, other research papers, defense acquisition references, periodicals, 
Internet searches, and databases. 
Definitions and concepts used in this research project are based upon DOD and 
Army definitions and acronyms related to aspects of acquisition management, T&E, the 
Army Transportation Corps, and the U.S. Navy. Definitions of acquisition and 
programmatic terms are provided where necessary to provide clarity and understanding. 
The list of acronyms is provided before the Executive Summary. 
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II. SERVICE TRANSFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS 
A. NAVAL STRATEGY CHANGE: IMPACTS ON REQUIREMENTS 
The transformation of the naval vision and strategy essentially mandated a 
commensurate change in its requirements to restore or enhance existing capabilities.  
“Sea-based operations use revolutionary information superiority and dispersed, 
networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive 
assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders” (Clark, 2002, p. 1). 
These aspects are found in Sea Power 21 Vision—a vision of the Navy’s intent to 
organize, integrate, and transform the Navy, increasing its precision, reach, and 
connectivity to achieve sea-based operational objectives as indicated by Admiral Vern 
Clark. New technologies enabled new concepts permitting an improved ability to 
integrate communication networks from the air, land, and sea. The employment of the 
JHSV in its naval-specific role is a key component and combat multiplier supporting the 
Sea Power 21 concept. 
In response to the changing paradigms for warfighting, the Navy’s Sea Power 21 
plan represented the transformational concept comprised of three component parts: Sea 
Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Base (Department of the Navy, 2005). 
Sea Shield represents the force protection or defense capability of the entire 
entity. It includes the use of electronic warfare, surface, air, and subsurface protective 
measures and execution. The JHSV plays a role in this requirement through the use of its 
C4ISR architecture operating as part of a larger force. Sea Strike represents the offensive-
oriented component of the fleet’s lethality and combat capability (Clark, 2002). The 
JHSV plays a required role in this aspect via its ability to project combat power. From a 
joint perspective, it is inclusive of force projection capabilities and the employment of 
surface and subsurface combatant ships, airpower, and ground troops. The Marine Corps 
represents the Navy ground combat capability. 
The Sea Base concept is essentially a floating force projection platform from 
which combat entities in the joint force plan and project offensive combat power. A Sea 
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Base or floating power projection platform operating just beyond the international sea 
boundary provides combatant commanders with the ability to operate independently of 
natural physical or geopolitical constraints. This strategic and operational concept is 
resource-intensive, but feasible, given the attributes that high-speed vessels possess and 
the capabilities they provide (Clark, 2002). 
Sea basing has a logistics-oriented component and JHSV’s required role provides 
the means to sustain the force with ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore supplies and equipment 
over extended distances and on time. Both the Army and Navy have a key interest in the 
requirements to meet this capability, although the concept is framed for the Navy as an 
aspect of sea basing and for the Army it is characterized as a key requirement to meet its 
capability to execute the RSOI tasks. Both essentially reduce or eliminate the time 
required to execute components of off-shore maneuver and logistics-oriented missions. 
As depicted in Figure 2, ForceNet integrates the components of Sea Strike, Sea 
Shield, and Sea Basing founded on the C4ISR architecture required to provide the 
operational construct and framework for effective command and control of a networked, 
distributed naval combat force. The concept of ForceNet and its intended use to the Navy 
strategy was a critical component and driver in the requirements process and 
establishment of priorities. The C4ISR suite was critical to the Navy’s capability to 
maintaining situational awareness in combat conditions, accelerating the speed of 
decision making in such conditions, and enabling “real-time, enhanced collaborative 
planning among joint and coalition partners” (Clark, 2002, p. 8). The C4ISR suite was a 
key component which the Army and Navy agreed upon as a high-priority joint 
requirement for this program. 
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Figure 2.  U.S. Navy’s Operational Concept—ForceNet. Source: Clark (2002). 
The JHSV, depicted as the TSV in Figure 3 (Clark, 2002), interfaces with joint 
formations in a sea-dominated environment or environment where operations in the 
littoral waters are an imperative for mission success. The conceptual depiction of the Sea 
Base component under ForceNet and the potential role for JHSV in that organizational 
design illustrates the Continental United States (CONUS) base and the JHSV requirement 
to self-deploy directly to a joint operations area (TSV WIPT, 2005). 
Once within the protective umbrella of the Sea Shield, JHSV would operate to 
ferry troops/Marines, equipment, and supplies from either an Army Regional Flotilla 
(Fast Sealift Ships) or a Maritime Prepositioning Group of ships. The JHSV role could 
also directly support a carrier-based Expeditionary Strike Group by providing high-speed 
access for troops to shallow draft and austere ports as depicted by the potential objectives 
along the shore line. Satellite communications provide command and control from both 
CONUS and within the joint operations area. The JHSV plays a key role and is a critical 
enabler in the Joint Force Commander’s ability to adapt and engage multiple objectives 
from operational levels and tactical levels of war. 
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Figure 3.  Navy Transformation—Operational Overview for JHSV Employment. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2005). 
B. ARMY TRANSFORMATION: IMPACTS ON REQUIREMENTS 
Like the Navy, the Army underwent its own restructuring and reorganization, 
given the National Security Strategy and an imperative to become leaner, more lethal, 
and more agile through technological advancements. The Army Transformation 
Roadmap serves as a blueprint for the Army’s organizational restructuring from the 
legacy force design of corps-division-brigade centric combat structure depicted in 
Figure 4 (Department of the Army, 2005), to an objective force design comprised of the 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as depicted in Figure 5. 
Navy Operational Overview




































Figure 4.  The Army Legacy Force Organizational Structure. Source: 
Department of the Army (2005). 
 
Figure 5.  Army Brigade-Centric Reorganizational Diagram. Source: Department 
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The BCT takes much of the divisional structure and some at the Corps level, then 
adds in all the enablers needed to create a powerful, broad-spectrum, brigade-level unit 
much more capable of independent action (Department of the Army, 2005). BCTs will be 
permanently task organized so they require minimal, if any, augmentation. Still, like the 
former mechanized, armored, or light infantry divisions, flexible groupings of modular 
brigades are also tailored to benefit and meet specific mission capabilities. These 
transformational changes of the Army structure were applicable to combat, combat 
support, and combat service support units. These changes impacted the various uses and 
requirements of the JHSV in a combat or combat service support role. 
The Army combat and combat service support roles for JHSV are similar to the 
Navy’s view design and execution. However, as we weight the warfighter’s perceived use 
for JHSV, the operational maneuver role takes on greater importance. Army ground 
component commanders do not expect to operate the JHSV under the force protection 
umbrella of the Navy in the JHSV combatant maneuver role, nor do they want to add 
layers of coordinating requirements. This defeats the flexibility and freedom of maneuver 
that JHSV provides in executing land-based combat operations injected from the seas. 
The projected method of employment for the JHSV by naval maneuver 
commanders (PEO for Ships, 2004) indicates the vessel or vessels would operate within a 
joint-oriented force structure. However, in the most likely scenarios for employment by 
Army commanders, the JHSV will likely operate independently of any larger sea-based 
force, outside of the Navy protective umbrella that is defined as the Sea Shield 
component of the Sea Power 21 Concept.  Conversely, JHSV could operate within the 
Sea Shield defined area as a dependent of the Navy force.  Employment of the JHSV 
under either condition supports transformational operational maneuver by combining 
situationally awareness to combat ready Soldiers with their equipment everywhere in the 
battlespace. JHSV likewise supports transformational sustainment capabilities by 
streamlining the RSOI process given its ability to access and egress from austere ports, 
all while providing total asset visibility of supplies and equipment. These maneuver and 
logistic oriented capabilities addressed key and critical components of the Army’s 
transformational objectives. Those capabilities in turn were vital and drivers to both the 
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requirements process and the development of the materiel solution demonstrated during 
the course of the experimental vessel program. 
1. Operational Requirements 
Operationally oriented requirements were largely associated with the deployment 
of U.S. forces and the subsequent combat roles of the Army, specifically its ability to 
employ forces at decisive points and times enabled by the JHSV. 
Mobility requirements, which originate at the strategic level, require the initial 
deployment of a “legacy” brigade combat team “wheels up” to anywhere in the world in 
96 hours after notification. As a continuance of that strategic lift requirement, the Army 
must be able to deploy a division on the ground within 120 hours, and an Army Corps 
consisting of up to five divisions within 30 days (Crowley, 2004). 
The analysis of the capability to meet these requirements is a measure of the 
capabilities against the requirement. Findings of the MRS BURU in 1995, and the 
subsequent MRS in 2005, indicated that there was “not sufficient lift to meet the 
requirement in two of the four Major Theater War (MTW) scenarios of the simulation 
model” (Jasmin, 2002). The extensive use of available commercial and military airlift and 
sealift capabilities was considered. Commercial capabilities were inclusive of foreign flag 
carriers for sealift and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) for airlift. 
The DOD’s original analysis yielded a requirement to move 66 million ton miles 
per day (MTM/D), which was two times greater than the existing capability at the time 
(Crowley, 2004). As a result, Congress provided a significant investment to develop what 
is today the C-17 Globemaster aircraft—another previous defense acquisition program. 
Incremental use of the CRAF in three stages and even a number of procured fast sealift 
ship capabilities still left the DOD short of the lift capability goals by nearly 50 MTM/D, 
based on a conflict with the Soviet Union. Similar calculated requirements were planned 
assuming two MTWs (GAO, 1998). 
The airlift and sealift requirements were then further broken out using the concept 
of prepositioning equipment and supplies close to or within the potential conflict regions. 
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This concept would (1) mitigate the risk of initial forces flowing into a theater of 
operations and (2) alleviate the strategic lift requirement by reducing the MTM/D 
requirement. Specifically, MRS recommended that airlift capabilities at endstate provide 
a range 49.4 to 51.8 MTM/D. The analysis for sealift recommended the procurement 
(defense acquisition) of 19 Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships, some 
of which would be used for prepositioning equipment forward. Contract shipping 
requirements require a range of 6000 to 6500 20-foot equivalent containers per week plus 
another 13 to 16 container or breakbulk ships specifically chartered to deliver 
ammunition (Crowley, 2004). 
With the paradigm shift in our expected future engagements and defense strategy, 
the strategic, operational, and tactical echelon lines are now blurred with regard to 
mobility requirements envisioned in the Army’s transformational roles for inter- and 
intratheater mobility requirements. The JHSV has a key and dynamic role in bridging or 
transitioning the strategic and operational or intratheater lift requirements. 
The ORD for the TSV (later renamed as JHSV) was produced by the Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) functional systems managers. These system managers 
provide the Army, and in some cases, DOD, oversight and management for categories of 
equipment like communications, watercraft, heavy-wheeled vehicles, artillery systems, 
armor combat systems, etc. In the case of the JHSV, operational requirements or key 
performance parameters outlined in the approved document Operational Requirements 
Document (Department of the Army, 2003b) were as follows:  
• Self-deployable over strategic distances 
• Average speed of 36+ knots fully loaded 
• Operational range of 1250 nautical miles 
• Shallow draft not to exceed 15 feet 
• Useable payload space of 1870 square feet; objective is 25–30K square 
feet 
• Cargo carrying capacity of 1250 short tons (~ 17 M1A2 tanks) 
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• Cargo handling capability for containerized, palletized, and rolling stock 
cargo 
• Passenger carrying capacity of 354 troops with combat gear 
These requirements (Department of the Army, 2003b) were generated using 
actual information paired with existing capabilities of the commercial industry, and 
confirmed in a series of exercises and demonstrations that were part of the ACTD 
experiments here and abroad. Other requirements were derived from the National 
Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and subsequent DOD directives. 
Specifically, the operational distances in the requirements listed above match the 
expected intratheater operational distances in which our combat forces would operate. 
The cargo carrying capacity was demonstrated, not necessarily with tanks because the 
ramp was a limiting factor, but with Bradley and Stryker vehicles. The troop carrying 
capacity aligns with an average company-sized combat element or one specifically 
tailored for combat. The shallow-draft requirement allows port access to a high 
percentage of the world’s ports not readily accessible to large LMRS or other typical 
ocean-going cargo ships. Speed, the most important factor in the requirement, was 
demonstrated as reliable and effective during exercises like Ulchi Focus Lens and Cobra 
Gold, where the actual transport of representative size forces and equipment were moved 
between Sasebo, Japan and Pyongteak, South Korea. 
In the joint environment of these exercises, the JHSV will have unique challenges 
related to command and control. It must also be capable of supporting combat, combat 
support, and combat service roles seamlessly. Finally, it will have to operate across 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. To do so, JHSV must be able to operate in a 
commercial environment and a military operating environment, simultaneously. 
Operating in commercial or non-military environments require compliance with 
mandates of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System and the Safety of Life at 
Sea treaties. From a joint perspective and when operating in a military environment, each 
service must be able to communicate effectively with the other making it necessary for 
the Navy’s ForceNet architecture and the Army’s LandwarNet command and control 
(C2) systems to be integrated on some level. The JHSV must also have the ability to 
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conduct ship-borne or embarked unit battle command center (BCC) operations for 
enroute mission planning and rehearsals. This is all possible through the vessel’s all-
encompassing C4ISR suite. 
The Army’s Battlefield Command Systems, Global Command and Control 
Systems-Joint, Blue Force Tracker, are enabled by the BCC having collaborative tools 
that operate through wideband SATCOM. The vessel’s local area network provides 
internal communications through an intercom system enhanced by data, voice and video-
teleconferencing. The BCC in the critical component that gives the JHSV a capability to 
employ firepower immediately and without delay.  
As defined by the initial and revised Operational Requirement Documents, the 
experimental TSV and the ultimate JHSV’s requires an “open” C4ISR design architecture 
capability is supposed to support Pre-Planned Product Improvements, software security 
and cyber security upgrades, and the integration of specialized sensors (Department of 
the Army, 2003b). The design that permits these potential upgrades and modifications are 
intended to have a minimal impact on vessel’s tactical computing environment. That 
means the C4ISR subsystem must have the capability to use data directly from the ship’s 
organic sensors, including the integrated bridge system for the vessel’s control, to create 
a tactical picture of the surrounding environment at and above the surface of the water. 
2. Logistical Requirements and Analysis 
Logistical requirements were driven by a number of factors that include Army, 
Title 10, and DOD Directives, and a comparative analysis of JHSV lift capability against 
the existing legacy fleet of Army watercraft and intratheater airlift capabilities. 
DOD Directive 5100.01 establishes the requirements for both organic Army 
aviation and Army watercraft. The Joint Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (JTTP) for 
Theater Distribution Responsibilities is Publication 4-01.4, and it defines the Army’s 
responsibility to “establish and operate coastal and inland waterways” (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2000, p. II-9). JTTP Transportation Terminal Operations described in Publication 
4-01.5, directs the Army to “establish and operate watercraft along intra-theater sea Lines 
of Communication and inland waterways” and “equip, train and employ U.S. Army units 
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for logistic amphibious operations in coordination with the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy 
units” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000, p. II-8). JTTP Joint Logistics over the Shore (JLOTS) 
directs the Army to “provide forces for and conduct JLOTS operations” and “provide 
lighterage, other discharge equipment, and trained operators for use in JLOTS operations 
and provide common-Service assets required to supplement amphibious operations, as 
required” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, p. II-3). These directives establish the mandates to 
support the argument and requirements for JHSV as a logistical combat multiplier. 
The following operational vignettes are focused on mobility at the operational 
level and illustrate the effects of the JHSV requirements (Crowley, 2004). Intratheater 
mobility capabilities for operational maneuver and sustainment are outlined in a 
comparison between JHSV and legacy watercraft using a notional vignette in which a 
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is employed from a distance of 720 nautical 
miles. As indicated by Crowley, because the JHSV travels at speeds up to four times 
faster than the current fleet vessels, a cost analysis and measurement of time, speed, and 
payload are integral and included in the analysis. 
In the illustration of JHSV metrics versus legacy Army watercraft (Figure 7), 
a BCT or similarly structured U.S. Marine Corps combat element is employed 
over operational distances to conduct combat operations. Three Logistic Support 
Vessels (LSVs) and 20 Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels represent the fleet 
resources for equipment and rolling stock (i.e., wheeled and tracked vehicles). 
Since the fleet is incapable of carrying Soldiers with their equipment and supplies, 
the troops, referred to as “Pax” in the diagram, must then relocate to an airport of 
embarkation to board the flights that will eventually link them to their equipment at 
the destination point. The comparative fleet of 12 JHSVs were used to move the 
same intact BCT consisting of Soldiers and all of their equipment from the 
seaport of embarkation at Naha Port, Okinawa, Japan to an injection point in the 
vicinity of Pusan, South Korea.
 The analysis of this scenario shows (1) a greater requirement and volume of 
resources, (2) a greater requirement in terms of time to close the force on the objective,  
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and (3) a greater cost in terms of dollars spent for the legacy vessels compared to 
the JHSV (Crowley, 2004). The total of 23 legacy vessels, plus some number of 
aircraft sorties to and from the equipment pick up point is substantially greater in 
terms of resources and time than the 12 JHSVs needed to accomplish the same mission 
in a faster, more efficient manner. The JHSV increases the lift capacity for equipment 
by greater than 50% with an added benefit of providing the same lift platform for 
personnel. The time savings difference of 38 days proves to be invaluable. Total cost 
savings using the resources identified is greater than 42% (Crowley, 2004). 
To a large degree, the use of JHSV significantly reduces or totally negates the 
conduct of RSOI operations saving more time and effort. The cost, in terms of 
maintenance and additional manpower that are required to operate the other systems 
is apparent, but not calculated in this scenario. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the 
employment timeline for a notional move of the SBCT on the Korean Peninsula. 
Figure 6.  Time, Distance, and Cost Comparisons to the Legacy Watercraft Fleet. 
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Figure 7.  Time, Distance, and Cost Comparisons to the Intratheater Airlift. 
Adapted from Crowley (2004). 
A similar analysis is conducted using intratheater airlift as the comparative 
platform for mobility. The same distance and notional parameters are used in this 
comparison to intratheater lift aircraft. Although the speed of the aircraft is much greater, 
this mobility platform is more constrained in its operational capabilities than either the 
JHSV or legacy watercraft. Unlike watercraft, aircraft require greater support for materiel 
or cargo handling equipment at both the ports of embarkation and debarkation. The 
operational costs of maintenance manhours and fuel are much higher also. The most 
restrictive factor, however, is the Max on Ground (MOG) number. The MOG is the 
maximum number of aircraft the originating or destination airfields are able to 
accommodate. It is often a matter of physical space to land, park, manage, and support 
aircraft. The size and volume of equipment being carried by aircraft also play a role in 
determining these factors. 
Analysis of modal transportation metrics conclude that use of the JHSV, in the 
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undeniable impact on the lift capacity and speed in which forces can be moved and 
sustained. A measure of the increased mobility is the reduction in time needed for 
material handling equipment to upload and download aircraft. 
Watercraft increase volume at the expense of speed, while aircraft increase speed 
at the expense of volume. The JHSV offers an enhanced capability for both speed and 
volume in either a tactical or logistical context. The requirements are valid. The results of 
this model study, coupled with actual data collected through demonstrations during the 
ACTD experimental period, reinforce the value of the JHSV using a comparative analysis 
of time. 
Despite the speed of individual airlift sorties, 12 JHSVs conducting 14 sorties 
could transport the SBCT in 3 days as opposed to the 12.4 days it would take 12 C-17s to 
complete 294 sorties (Crowley, 2004). The same source indicates that using the smaller 
C-130 intratheater airlift platform, it would take 120 C-130 aircraft nearly 800 sorties to 
complete the move. The MOG factors are relative in their use for airports in the vicinity 
of Kimhae, South Korea.  The MOG varies in number based on the physical dimensions 
of the aircraft used. The MOG shown for the JHSV equates to the number of fixed 
military pier spaces. In littoral combat or sustainment operations, that number is limited 
by a combination of coastal space and austere ports and quay walls where the JHSV is 
able to download ashore. Even when the JHSV travels a lesser distance, it still 
outperforms the aircraft by a significant margin in both total operational cost and time. 
Additionally, there is a benefit of relieving the burden of the demands for 
intratheater airlift—a premium asset. In virtually every exercise in which an experimental 
TSV has participated during the ACTD, the cost savings realized by the reduced 
requirement for airlift is a critical benefit to logisticians and MFE personnel alike. 
When making the transition from strategic lift to operational intratheater lift, the 
JHSV, in its role as a logistics support platform, still provides significant savings in cost, 
time, and effort to LOTS operations. Using the same operational area of South Korea in a 
scenario where LOTS operations have to be performed to download and transport 
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prepositioned equipment and supplies, the JHSV’s capabilities are unmatched by current 
legacy watercraft in the Army inventory (Crowley, 2004). 
An analysis of the time and resource requirements of in-the-stream discharge or 
LOTs operations in the vicinity of Incheon is shown in Table 1. Repositioning of an 
entire SBCT is considered, given favorable weather and sea state conditions. Please note 
that such operations are manpower intensive and time consuming to establish, operate, 
and close. Those factors are not considered in the timelines in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Watercraft Transport Time Analysis. Adapted from Crowley (2004). 
 
 
Table 1 clearly shows that significant savings in terms of tangible resources, cost, 
and time are provided through the use of the JHSV. This operational vignette is a notional 
depiction of the vessel’s capability using known and estimated data on the requirements 
for the JHSV and existing transportation lift assets. Whether aircraft are used singularly 
or in combination with sealift platforms, the JHSV provides a critical capability to 
mitigate risk to the timing of landing initial forces. This capability is paramount to 
Combat Commanders and the success of both operational and logistics-oriented missions. 
With regard to off-shore missions under the Army RSOI operation or the Navy Sea 
Basing concept, the JHSV provides the necessary intratheater continuum (from strategic 
to operational lift) and dynamic flexibility. 
The key analysis focuses on the impact of the transformational Army structure 
and the SBCT in particular. Strategically, the SBCT could not, in most cases, meet the 
initial 96-hour deployment timeline despite an approximate 50% reduction in the weight 
requirement for movement. An SBCT deployment would take 5 to 14 days, depending on 
the point of origin and the destination. When the restructured SBCT consisting of 19-ton 
armored vehicles is compared to an armored brigade equipped with 68-ton Abrams tanks 
Resource Transport Time (Days) Vessels Used Individual Sorties 
TSV 4 6 20 
LSV/LCU 2000 17.2 3/20 95 
LMSR w/o Port Access 7.7 1 1 
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and 33-ton Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the difference and impact on transportation lift 
requirements are obvious. 
For intratheater movements, the ORD calculates that 12 JHSVs will move the 
combat power of a single SBCT; each JHSV will move the personnel and Stryker 
vehicles equivalents of two companies. That would entail 300 Stryker armored vehicles 
and nearly 3,900 troops. The movement of the SBCT is further facilitated by its ability to 
quickly upload and offload the JHSV with 3 days of supply. Conversely, a heavy armored 
brigade combat team would take days to draw an abundance of fuel and ammunition 
before commencing combat operations. 
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III. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
A. ACQUISITION PROCESSES AND REQUIREMENTS 
Every single-service, joint, or multi-service acquisition program is governed by 
legislation, regulations and policies that govern the management of that program. The 
effectiveness of the IPT in its management of the program as it relates to matching 
requirements with capabilities ought to first examine guidelines that direct the acquisition 
processes that drive the requirements processes—first from an individual Army service 
perspective and then from the joint acquisition process standpoint.  
Systems built from “scratch” require developmental testing which is the 
verification/validation of technical parameters using such quantitative methodologies as 
modeling and simulation, for example. After completion of developmental tests, 
operational testing is conducted to determine the capabilities and limitations of the 
system under the conditions which it is expected to perform (Department of the Army, 
2002). Planning and coordinating the T&E of systems is first and foremost dependent 
upon the missions for which the system is being developed. In the case of the TSV, 
developmental testing equates to an existing capability, effectiveness, and acceptability of 
commercial standards to meet military requirements. In this situation, the ACTD sought 
to eliminate or reduce risk through the conduct of experiments similar to a combined 
developmental/operational type of test. The ACTD was funded and managed accordingly 
(Deputy Undersecretary for Defense, Advanced Concepts and Systems, 2002). 
Acquisition-related procedural changes or methodologies are mandated by either 
U.S. law or the ever-present and increasing need to streamline the procurement process 
and get equipment to the field faster and with greater efficiency. This acquisition process 
includes T&E. The commissioned study of the Defense Acquisition Reform Act that was 
conducted post-World War II and the subsequent Presidential Blue Ribbon Defense Panel 
Report forced a re-evaluation of the processes by which defense acquisitions are made for 
national security (Bair, 1994). The findings require a charter to eliminate duplication of 
efforts in research and development, procurement, and supply. The panel report and 
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acquisition reform shaped the basis for change to the structure of the Acquisition Corps 
and its processes that were split into separate but related areas of acquisition and T&E. 
Borne from this report was the advent of an independent T&E activity for each of the 
service components: Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), Navy Commander 
Operational Test and Evaluation Forces, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation 
Center, and Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity. 
In light of the requirement for each service component to have an independent 
T&E agency, processes and objectives of such activities vary just enough to cause 
cultural service conflict within the DOD. Such conflict and short- or long-term 
resolutions must be addressed to serve the interest of national security. The Defense 
Acquisition Reform Act established the background by which defense acquisition 
changes were developed and implemented for both materiel development and T&E 
agencies. 
As the ATEC’s System Team Chairperson responsible for the T&E development 
and execution of the TSV ACTD and subsequent JHSV program of record, I experienced 
and learned of unique insights of the management of both programs firsthand. For the 
Army, common core procedures were followed and included the review of requirements 
for testability and evaluation of the system’s capabilities.  
The study on the Transformation of Army Test and Evaluation (Brown, 2004) 
discusses significant organizational and procedural changes to “independent evaluations” 
for developmental systems. Despite the improved planning and execution of independent 
developmental and operational tests and evaluations, some disconnects and inefficiencies 
still exist within the materiel acquisition process. This report indicates that perhaps like a 
similarly suggested evolution in the joint acquisition processes, which include T&E, there 
ought to be a likewise or at least a collaborated change within the Army Service 
Component acquisition processes. 
The study by the Army War College on An Evolving Joint Acquisition Force 
recognizes that recent major conflicts such as Operations Desert Storm/Shield and Iraqi 
Freedom mandate an evolution in joint warfighting doctrine (Jennings, 2004). Under 
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current worldwide demands and U.S. military presence, no service can operate 
independently. The inherent requirement of all services mandates self-examination of 
policy and procedures that support the warfighter in the areas of research and 
development, T&E, and ultimately procurement. Component services must have and act 
according to a holistic view of the national defense strategy without undue compromise 
to specific service mission requirements. Therefore, the prospect of “reorganizing the 
acquisition community into a truly joint DOD organization that integrates and serves all 
component services should be explored.” (Jennings, 2004, p. 1). Representation of 
material developers and testers is proposed at high levels within the DOD and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Brown, 2004). 
In the case of the individual technology demonstrations by the Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps, compliance with the acquisition principles outlined by the Blue Ribbon 
study and other guiding references was followed. 
With regard to whether or not the Army used the processes to sufficiently drive 
the requirements, the answer is a resounding “Yes.” The MRS study revealed and 
confirmed that the impact of the TSV on inter-theater and intratheater movement is 
essential to both the aircraft lift and sealift capabilities (Jasmin, 2002). The Army 
transformational and mobility factors were sufficient to drive the requirements process 
that warranted a material solution such as JHSV. Proof of principle on a smaller scale 
was demonstrated in several exercises and real-world actual missions involving troops 
and equipment movements over various distances. 
For the Army, the process related to using logistical data was relatively 
straightforward and unassuming. The United States Army Transportation Corps was clear 
about the positive impact the JHSV would have on the fleet and the Army’s ability to 
conduct logistics support as required by Joint Operations statutes and directives. 
The Army Transportation Corps arguments, which greatly supported the 
requirements of the JHSV as the platform for providing operational logistical support, 
were absolutely compelling. Its assessment and support of the MRS study and findings 
eventually carried more weight than those arguments presented within the Army by that 
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segment focused on the warfighting capabilities of the JHSV. Specific requirements 
regarding payload, decreased mission time over distance, and access to austere ports for 
the delivery of personnel, equipment, and supply were well founded (USATC, 2002a). 
Strategically oriented requirements were largely associated with the deployment 
of U.S. forces, and the subsequent direct combat-oriented requirements were largely 
affixed to the employment of combat forces in the theater of operations for the Army and 
Navy (including Marine Corps). The weight of what was initially to be a supporting 
argument for the JHSV became the critical focus of the Army’s Watercraft and 
Restructuring Plan (USATC, 2002b). 
An assessment by the Army Chief of Transportation concluded that divesting 
Army watercraft is an all-or-none proposition and key to consideration of the program 
requirements by both Army and DOD (other service) senior leaders (Department of the 
Army, 2004). The Army Transportation Chief intended to convey a message that DOD 
cannot divest the intratheater lift mission under the assumption that a force structure, in 
times of declining resources for all services, would be re-allocated as a higher Army 
priority or redefined as a Navy-only mission. This position, widely accepted by 
logisticians and specifically, the Army Transportation Corps, was borne of the perception 
that once fielded, the Army priority for use of the JHSV would be much lower than 
initially intended (Mulcahy, 2005). In being responsible and meeting the statutory and 
doctrinal requirements, the Army leadership fought and eventually prevailed in making a 
case to prioritize the JHSV as an absolutely essential requirement under Army control 
and as a vital part of its watercraft restructuring plans. Emphasis to sustain the DOD drive 
toward this materiel solution was highly encouraged based on substantive reports, 
indicators, and analysis  
To do otherwise would adversely affect intratheater lift capability of the existing 
watercraft fleet and the ability of the service to sustain its current structure given the 
fleet’s approach to the end of its economic useful service life between 2013 and 2018. An 
analysis of the cost factors of maintaining the old fleet or acquiring new capabilities also 
weighed heavily in supporting arguments to sustain requirements and the drive toward 
the JHSV as a solution for the Army watercraft mission sets. Otherwise, the Navy would 
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have to assume all current Army watercraft doctrinal roles and responsibilities, to include 
cost. This was a daunting proposition—one that neither service was interested in 
entertaining. As a full-service watercraft provider, the Navy would have to be willing, 
prioritized, and funded, and allocated or re-allocated a force structure to do so effectively. 
Currently there is no resident port management for tugs and heavy lift crane operations in 
the Navy. To add that capability to the Navy would necessitate wholesale changes to the 
delineation of joint service missions. 
Previous mobility studies spurned by the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(Rumsfeld, 2001) and conducted in 1992, 1995 and 1998 indicated that there were still 
significant shortfalls in Army intratheater airlift and responsiveness (GAO, 1998). A 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit confirmed the assessment, giving more 
impetus to the JHSV materiel solution (GAO, 1998). Also associated with the force 
structure impacts was the issue of manning the vessels with civil maritime crews, 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) crews, reservists, or active duty personnel. Vessels 
operated by the Navy typically operate with a greater number of personnel that includes 
commissioned officers. Manning for Army vessels typically consists of significantly 
smaller crews commanded by warrant officers. The personnel structure with regard to 
manning the vessels became an important aspect of the negotiations, but not necessarily a 
contentious point. 
B. RESOLVING COMPETING INTERSERVICE REQUIREMENTS 
Where two services are concerned, the challenges of determining, establishing, 
and satisfying all requirements can be much more daunting. In this JHSV program, 
competing and somewhat divergent service needs and JHSV capabilities made the 
process difficult but not insurmountable. Because the requirements for each service were 
valid, legitimate, and necessary, both the Army and the Navy found it difficult to argue 
against the other’s position on these matters. This became a critical concern that would 
need compromise and the interjection of a joint body to resolve the conflicts. Differences 
in how this acquisition would be managed became a point of contention. 
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Challenges arose when the results of the Army requirements process conflicted 
with the results of the requirements process of the Navy. For example, the manning 
structure for a Navy vessel is different than the manning structure for an Army vessel, 
using the same process to arrive at a different conclusion. 
Between 2001 and 2003, three separate but related experiments concerning the 
use of high-speed, shallow-draft vessels were ongoing: the Army’s TSV ACTD, the 
Navy’s experiments with HSV Swift (for minesweeping operations), and the Marine 
Corps lease of a High-Speed Connector for troop movements. SOCOM used a second 
Army-leased vessel (HSV 1X) for both experiments and actual combat-related missions. 
All three of these technology demonstrations supported the doctrinal use, mission, 
and focus of the respective service. Still there was conflict in finding some agreeable 
commonality in the vessel design. In an attempt to sort through the differences, the Army 
Marine Corps Board (AMCB) was convened to review data and information collected 
during numerous experiments up to that date (AMCB, 2003). Discussions centered on the 
JHSV employment in accordance with the Navy’s Sea Basing Concept under the Sea 
Power 21 Vision and the Army’s Force Projections imperatives. Discussions also 
confirmed that this commercially based, high-speed vessel technology could be 
integrated and adapted to provide unique and diverse military capabilities. At its end, the 
AMCB recommended a joint program founded on a Common Operational and 
Organizational Plan that provided a single, interchangeable solution for both services’ 
needs. As a consequence, Program Executive Office (PEO) Combat & Combat Service 
Support and PEO Ships signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to establish an 
executive steering committee that would coordinate and oversee high-speed vessel 
development and production.   
In January 2005, the MOA, which was developed as a collaborative effort under 
the direction of the IPT chair, established a balanced approach to development of a joint, 
multiservice program. The MOA gave credence to the effort since it was agreed upon by 
the Army and Navy Acquisition Executives. This effort also led to the revision of 
requirements as the former governing document, the ORD, was transitioning into the 
formal Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. The 
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JHSV program lead was assigned to and managed by the Navy’s Project Manager Ships 
(PMS) 325, to leverage the Navy’s core competency in ship acquisition. PMS 325 is a 
program office under PEO Ships and it is responsible for managing the design and 
construction of support ships, boats, and crafts. To some, the decision for PMS 325 to 
manage the JHSV program was interpreted to mean other services would essentially lose 
the ability to influence the outcome of the ship’s design. With the decision to assign the 
JHSV program to the Navy, Army program managers feared that the Army’s operational 
requirements for the vessel would not receive the proper considerations and place at risk 
its Title 10 logistical responsibilities to the joint service environment. Some thought 
Army requirements and mission-essential needs would become an afterthought, and that 
there would be little or no return on the Army’s investment in the ACTD. That fear or 
assumption was not necessarily accurate since the requirements-related actions of all 
stakeholders were used to establish the foundation with a joint perspective on prioritizing 
needs. This action would help to reduce program risk while also addressing operational 
gaps in the context of both service’s needs. 
Program management meetings conducted in the Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
construct were held to first establish ground rules (a charter). The charter would provide 
purpose and function to the group, focusing on how to meet or negotiate differing or 
sometimes conflicting requirements for both services. For example, the Army did not 
want a helicopter flight deck because it would increase the manpower and distribution of 
required onboard military occupational skill sets. Many Army rotary wing pilots were 
also not qualified to perform sea-based deck landings. Therefore, the helicopter flight 
deck yielded two unintended consequences for training and operations. The Navy 
considered a helicopter flight deck to be vital to its core operations and more importantly, 
movement within the Sea Power 21 concepts. The differences in Army or Navy processes 
and priorities were identified and discussed to provide a common understanding and set 
the conditions to negotiate programmatic specifics. 
Not everyone in the Army advocated the JHSV as a materiel solution and many in 
the Navy considered this another vessel. As a result, the Army would be forced to simply 
follow the Navy’s lead without along without objection. That perception is a service bias, 
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real or perceived, that initially adversely affected the working relationship between 
service action officers and program managers. The process adequately defined the 
requirements by laying a foundation for defining the ultimate materiel solution that was 
delivered. 
C. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Logistics for this JHSV program had peculiar differences and processes between 
the Army and Navy. Programmatic issues pertaining to requirements challenged the 
leadership. Manning authorizations are mandated and proportioned by the service 
component. Therefore, any significant increase in manpower requirements, particularly in 
light of existing recruitment and retention challenges, could have in fact, jeopardized the 
acquisition program or some aspect thereof. In the case of the TSV ACTD program, the 
Army initially planned to transfer the LSV crew of 31 personnel to the TSV. The 
technological differences in communications and navigation systems, the operation of 
self-defense systems, and propulsion engineering system improvements required a more 
robust crew with greater redundancy. The size of the crew has yet to be determined or 
cost analyzed in its entirety. This very topic will cause some level of consternation 
between branches within the Army if personnel authorizations cause a reduction or shift 
in other military occupational skill authorizations. 
PMS 325 initially headed the program that eventually transitioned under the 
control of PMS 385. Two years after the JHSV passed Milestone B, the third Integrated 
Logistics Support (ILS) Summit was held in June 2010. Prior to this time, a tug-of-war 
ensued between the services and even within the program offices of the Navy. The Army 
MFE personnel and logisticians struggled over the primary use and employment of the 
vessel. Logistically, there were significant differences between how the services planned 
and managed life-cycle costs and integrated logistics. 
The ILS Summit III, therefore, began by establishing ground rules that would 
guide the program strategy forward and as comprehensively as possible. Ten fundamental 
rules were established, but four of those rules were critical to a positive ILS-related 
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outcome for all stakeholders.1 The first such rule stated that all ILS products would be 
developed and delivered in accordance with the baseline configuration and policies. 
Affixing the ILS efforts and products according to a baseline would be beneficial, but 
issues arise when there is a question of which policy—Army or Navy—would prevail. 
The second rule would help clarify the latter concern of policy. It stated that the 
user services are the ultimate customers. Requirements generation for the services were 
different as indicated by the use of the experimental vessels leased by the Army and 
Navy. The Naval focus was minesweeping and the Army focus included special 
operations and logistics. A joint Memorandum of Understanding set the conditions for 
the group to work through challenges by ensuring unique processes such as type 
classification, materiel release, and new equipment training were adhered to in 
accordance with U.S. Army procedures. This memorandum is one such example used to 
ensure service-specific requirements and policies were adhered to without undue 
compromise and costs. 
The third rule stated that all ILS planning efforts shall consider common support 
opportunities. This rule greatly affected the program costs by creating an unofficial 
barrier to a service’s ability to introduce “nice-to-have” items (Lukens, 2010). 
The fourth rule focused everyone on the common goal to deliver a safe, 
supportable, and suitable ship. With the delivery of the first ship to the Army in 
December of 2012, the first vessel has undergone a series of sea trials that was largely 
indicative of its success. 
In a related assessment, maintenance planning proved to be a favorable strength 
of the program management. The maintenance concept is crucial to development of many 
other logistic elements including supply support, technical manuals, and training. The 
integrated logistics support plan was updated to reflect the JHSV maintenance concepts. 
Adequate planning was performed to indicate that both the Army and the MSC will have 
                                                 
1 As the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) System Team (AST) Chair representing the 
Army’s test and evaluation interest in the high speed vessel ACTD, and author of this report, the 
information provided herein is based on firsthand knowledge and participation in the discussions that led to 
these conclusions. All information provided herein is a matter of public record. 
 38 
stand-alone documents developed to perform their required organizational-level 
maintenance requirements. In a related measure, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
contracts for specific services were let at locations around the globe. 
Common knowledge, no matter the service, indicates the supply support concept 
for either service clearly affects decisions related to receiving, cataloging, transferring or 
issuing, and disposing of spare and repair parts as a critical function. The supply support 
concept was poorly defined initially, but improved over time with discussion on several 
areas of concern including use of readiness-based sparing, single life-cycle supply 
support methodology, and life-cycle support of supply documentation for each 
component. With implementation of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) beyond what 
was identified previously in a preliminary list, PMS 385 later transferred many of the 
logistics functions to include aspects to common parts, to MSC. Previously, PMS 385 
relied on the contractor to analyze and recommend what spares would be carried onboard 
the vessel. This is an area that still needs emphasis today, perhaps in efforts aimed at 
improving the maintenance posture via reliability growth measures. 
The impacts of the man/machine interface were analyzed in an effort to determine 
the right mix of crew sizes and skill sets given the fundamental differences between an 
Army and Navy mariner. Navy crews are led by commissioned officers; Army crews are 
typically fewer in number and led by a warrant officer and a majority enlisted crew. This 
is not to say that either Service’s manning methodology is less or more capable than the 
other, but it is a fundamental difference that challenges the manning and training issues. 
A finding of early assessments shared at the Summit indicated that only one-third of the 
Army crew will demonstrate an adequacy skill level to operate complex automation 
systems, technical publications, test tools and equipment, and general and complex at-sea 
maintenance operations (Lukens, 2010). The question is whether or not one-third is good 
enough in offering the requisite redundancy and flexibility to operate the vessel in under 
circumstances or over extended distances. In the end, the manning aspect of the JHSV for 
both the Army and the Navy were turned over to merchant marines/mariners under the 
direction of the MSC. 
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Finally, the issue of developing life-cycle sustainment for MSC and the Army was 
initially of great concern. PMS 385 is not a life-cycle program manager, but serves only 
during the acquisition phase of the vessel. After vessel deployment, the Army and MSC 
are responsible for support, configuration control, operational needs, and all activities 
associated with the sustainment phase of the life cycle. The other services are aware of 
this fact. 
D. A UNIQUELY NEGOTIATED MATERIEL SOLUTION 
Even under the guidance established by the AMCB, the charter of the joint IPT, 
and guidelines to govern human systems integration, the group could not agree on the 
final materiel solution. The JHSV for the Navy would look, perform, and be operated 
somewhat differently than the Army ship. 
The Army’s focus and critical need leaned heavily toward to the use of the JHSV 
as a logistics support platform, not a combat platform which was part of Navy 
experiments. The JHSV with its aluminum hull is not for use in combat or non-
permissive environments. It can, however, be used by Special Forces operators in austere 
environments or restricted-access ports. During the Navy and Army experiments, adding 
some degree of armament or weaponry for self-defense was considered. The JHSV has 
the capacity and framework to accept any kind of weapon system, but at the expense of 
significantly reducing its cargo-carrying capability, and perhaps speed. The decision to 
arm the JHSV for the Army was essentially rejected in part due to perhaps a likewise 
increase in manning, and maintenance operating costs and time. 
The compromise eventually became an alternating procurement of vessels. Of the 
10 ships originally budgeted for purchase, the Army was to receive the odd-numbered 
ships off the production line (1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) and the Navy would receive the even-
numbered ships (2, 4, 6, 8 and 10) (Spearhead-Class Expeditionary Fast Transport, 2016). 
This action, although surprising, allowed the necessary degree of trade space to meet 
unique requirements and capabilities needed by each service. 
The solution started as a small victory for both services, particularly the Army 
whose fears were allayed by the notion that all of its requirements would be recognized 
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and included in the vessel design. After vessel delivery, each service was originally 
responsible for manning (including training), maintaining, and providing full life-cycle 
support for its vessels. The first vessel, originally named United States Army Vessel 
Spearhead was originally scheduled to be delivered to the 7th Sustainment Brigade, 
formerly the 7th Transportation Group (Composite) at Fort Eustis, Virginia. A later 
change in the stationing plan called for a transfer of all JHSVs to the MSC where all 
vessels would be crewed by civilian sailors.  
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IV. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This research project examined the ACTD and its impact in determining or 
confirming the requirements process for an eventual program of record, and it identified 
issues with the overarching acquisition process, and requirements-generation process 
within segments of the Army, the Navy, and in a joint program environment. It also 
identified IPT-related issues and measures taken to establish and manage a vetting 
process that helped to facilitate communication of each service’s key requirements for a 
joint program under the Navy’s lead for program management. 
The ACTDs conducted by the services were integral to the acquisition process for 
this particular program and its impact on the DOD’s ability to meet the warfighter’s 
critical needs as defined by the National Military Strategy. Through a series of lengthy 
and multifaceted exercises and events, all services proved military utility for the vessel’s 
intended uses in the context of that service’s mission. The experiments by the Army, 
Navy, and Marine Corps provided proof of principle and military utility for a commercial 
capability. However, the experiments and the findings of each made the prioritization of 
requirements very difficult to determine. 
When concerns arise and program management becomes more of a challenge than 
originally intended, a closer look at the policies, regulations, and guidelines that steer the 
defense acquisition process becomes necessary. Following a Blue Ribbon Panel, the 
DOD realized changes that streamline the process needed a review. To my recollection, 
the ACTD streamlined the processes identified in the Blue Ribbon report used in the lead 
up to JHSV as a program of record. This particular program, however, had its timeline for 
actual procurement extended by a number of factors that included the contract 
development, joint program management, and disagreements therein in the IPT. 
Nonetheless, the importance of the program was recognized by the senior program 
management leaders and conditions were established to resolve all points of contention. 
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Each service determined requirements based on the limited scope of its individual 
or service missions outlined in the National Military Strategy. The Army had a dual focus 
centered on operational maneuver for combat units and on logistics support. Likewise, 
the Marine Corps and Navy had ideas and their own narrow scope of requirements to 
meet their mission assignments. As the program progressed and was designated a joint 
program, the result of the requirements-generation process met with conflicts and there 
were some disconnects in the joint requirements generation. Those disconnects were 
successfully addressed with the use of the three-star AMCB (committee) and a charter 
that governed the conduct of the IPT stakeholders for negotiating and prioritizing 
requirements for each service variant. Although it can be argued that the ultimate 
decision to alternate vessels coming off the production line was not intended to change 
for the individual service, the same argument can be made that the conditions set by the 
charter and AMCB’s input established an environment that yielded such a result. The 
unique challenges of this joint program ended with a unique solution that satisfied all 
stakeholders from both services, despite the difficulty in reaching that conclusion. 
JCIDS is the current DOD capabilities-based requirements process. The previous 
requirements-generation process failed to consider new defense acquisition programs in 
the context of other programs, it insufficiently considered combined service requirements 
and priorities as part of its AoA, and it therefore failed to provide sufficient analysis. The 
experiences and findings revealed by the ACTD facilitated the current capabilities-based 
requirements-generation process. 
The requirements-generation process is a testimony to its intended purpose and 
despite the number of self-imposed intra- and interservice challenges experienced by both 
services over the long life of this program, the acquisition program was successful. The 
requirements process positively impacted the acquisition of the JHSV. Some might view 
the JCIDS process as having a marginal bureaucratic impact, but the research and 
evidence showed that this experiment, which transitioned to a program of record, used a 
directive committee, the AMCB, to properly steer the procurement. It did so by setting 
the ground rules and facilitating the process in a manner in which both services could 
address their unique requirements. The JCIDS process, through its use of the Joint 
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Requirement Oversight Council, likewise set the conditions for a successful program, 
despite initial challenges caused by differing efforts and the focus of individual service 
experiments with high-speed vessels. 
The Army’s intraservice conflicts between MFE personnel and logisticians added 
contention to the difficulties with identifying and justifying requirements. Given the 
internal strife of the Army with regard to identifying and prioritizing requirements for its 
service, the Navy could have easily surmised that if the Army could not decide what was 
wanted and needed internally, how could they in good conscience convey a solid message 
in the joint program management environment?  In a joint program environment, it is 
essential that requirements and priorities be deliberately well defined. The Army position 
was clearly weighted toward the needs of the logisticians, specifically the transportation 
corps, and its uncompromising battle for the Army Watercraft fleet upgrade. Even with 
today’s standing vision of the National Strategy Imperatives which clearly focus on the 
Pacific Theater, there is not much of an indication that the tactical and operational aspects 
and requirements exercised during the experiments were high priority for the Army. 
Initially, there was little evidence of truly “joint” planning among the two key 
participating services, the Army and the Navy. Upon transfer of the program management 
to PEO Ships, IPT discussions eventually led to the establishment of regular logistics 
meetings and routinely scheduled teleconferences. These meetings kept all parties 
engaged and were therefore effective in identifying and resolving issues expeditiously. 
They also assured all stakeholders that documents and plans were being discussed, 
although sometimes not easily resolved. The meetings were a major step in effectively 
managing the program because they provided a mechanism to raise, address, and resolve 
concerns. ATEC eventually dropped out as the Army’s Operational Test Agency 
responsible for the evaluation of the JHSV, but some connections with regard to 
developmental testing and ILS evaluation plans remained through the third logistics 
summit and onto sea trials for the first and second Army vessels. 
Because the issue of manning the vessels would have negatively impacted or at 
least caused a significant change in the force structure of both services, it became more 
and more apparent that MSC’s use of civilian mariners (CIVMAR) would be the best 
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solution. Arriving at that conclusion took some time, but was best for the program as 
indicated by a formal decision at a later date and time. Ships manned by a contract would 
employ U.S. citizen contract mariners (CONMAR). This action relieved Army and Navy 
manning issues somewhat while keeping an appropriate level of access to the JHSV as 
part of its joint-directed missions. Those matters related to personnel training, 
maintenance, and most importantly, operation of on-board systems as it pertains to 
maritime law and best practices also provided for the incorporation of the MSC as the 
system’s manager and operator. The use of the CONMARS and CIVMARs under MSC 
was the best solution even though the original requirements did plan for the eventual 
outcome. Other government-owned or -leased sealift vessels fall under the control and 
direction of MSC. It is a rational, logical choice that JHSVs operate similarly. 
Having reached a relative impasse on the logistics and manning issues related to 
JHSV, IPT discussions began with considerations of CIVMARs to operate some number 
of vessels and CONMARs to operate some number of vessels. This approach would help 
alleviate the issue of each service’s challenge to align manpower design, i.e., rank 
structure and vessel crew organization, with the vessels at the time of delivery. JHSVs 
will be crewed by CONMARs working through private shipping companies under 
contract to MSC on a competitively awarded contract. “CONMARs will man/crew the 
ships and be responsible for virtually all aspects of on-board operations and maintenance” 
(Global Security Organization, 2012, p. 1). Military mission personnel will embark as 
required or designated based on the sponsoring service’s mission(s) or task(s) (TSV 
WIPT, 2005). 
The Army was exceptionally effective in bearing out the statistical information 
and research data that supported and justified JHSV requirements. Mobility factors 
primarily discovered or confirmed by the mobility requirements studies were in fact 
sufficient to justify and drive the requirements process for the JHSV from an operational 
perspective. 
The MRS of 2005 did what it was intended to do as well—enable the Joint Chief 
and Services Chiefs to gain insight into the inter and intra theater lift shortfalls and 
capability gaps, which provided information for programmatic decisions to be made. The 
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comparison of sealift and existing Army watercraft lift capabilities made it clear that 
DOD and statutory directives would in fact be at risk if those shortfalls or capability gaps 
were not addressed quickly. Even using what was initially thought to be a nearly 
impossible scenario where the nation would have to fight two major theater wars 
simultaneously, the analysis revealed several issues and a definite inability to meet 
mobility requirements. There were, in fact, two major wars taking place in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, but perhaps not to the magnitude defined by the simulation models. Still, the 
number of aircraft needed to meet the notional intratheater lift proved to be critical and 
was later validated by an independent review of the requirements. Intratheater watercraft 
lift, even when using forward prepositioned equipment and stocks, did not provide any 
significant difference in reducing the timelines according to the analysis. The analysis 
supports the integration of JHSV for lift as a means to close the gap in deployment, 
employment and resupply timelines over distance.  
With these facts, a clear case is made with an unquestionable and rational 
explanation that a means to address the shortfall for intratheater lift capability, 
specifically through the employment of the JHSV, would make an impact in closing the 
capability gap using its key system attributes of both volume (lift capacity) and speed. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results and lessons learned from a series of various experiments with shallow 
draft, high speed, aluminum hull vessels, indicated that a conversion of this commercial 
capability for military use was a viable solution necessary to develop further through the 
acquisition process. The ACTD process, by its design, accelerated the acquisition process 
validating its effective use in determining and developing a materiel solution as it relates 
to cost, schedule and performance. The JHSV, by way of the ACTD program, filled an 
impending capability gap for the individual Services and for joint service operations that 
further supported the national military strategy and related directives.   
This does not mean the ACTD was without fault in some applications and 
management of its processes. Some problems with this program, in particular, revealed 
the need for a closer examination, and perhaps refinement or improvement to how 
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ACTDs are applied to some aspects or subcomponent parts of a particular program. One 
such recommended improvement recommended by GAO address shortfalls or a lack of 
criteria for assessing the maturity of some proposed technologies. This shortfall was not 
solely specific to the case in this TSV ACTD (as an overarching program); however, it 
may have contributed to some of the challenges that were faced with the evolving 
technology that governs or supports the C4ISR demands, for example. The DOD has 
improved its guidance regarding the maturity of the technologies, but that guidance 
contains exceptions that depending on the technology, could effectively hinder the goals 
that shorten the acquisition schedule as intended. With specific regard to the TSV ACTD, 
although “commercial items that do not require any further development could proceed 
directly to production, many ACTDs may still need to enter the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase to proceed with product and concept development and 
testing before entering begins” (GAO, 1998, p. 8).  
Concerning the GAO audit of the ACTD process and its effectiveness, the 
Secretary of Defense should clarify the technology demonstration guidance to the Service 
Chiefs to “(1) ensure that the use of mature technology, with few, if any, exceptions, is a 
paramount consideration,” (2) limit the number of prototypes to be procured to the 
quantities needed for early user demonstrations, and (3) ensure that the selection of the 
appropriate acquisition entry point is responsibly determined (GAO, 1998, p. 8). The 
GAO report suggests that the operational testing agencies should actively participate in 
the ACTD assessment process (GAO, 1998). Although this program took quite a long 
time to transition from the technology demonstration phases to the program of record, the 
use of ACTDs in determining and confirming requirement validity are useful and should 
be continued whenever possible. This is particularly true since it has been shown that use 
the ACTD concept often has a positive impact on time, schedule, and performance—all 
key requirements in the management of any defense acquisition project. This fact has 
been proven in not only the JHSV program, but in a number of unmanned aerial vehicle 
programs as well. 
The proper application and use of ACTDs may directly impact and drive the 
requirements process, which includes a confirmation of capabilities, program risk 
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reduction, and priorities for system requirements. Therefore, it is recommended that 
continued refinement and application of the joint requirements process continue and that 
the enforcement of the joint defense acquisition policy be enforced at the operator and 
executive levels of program management. The use of an overarching committee like the 
AMCB and the IPT functions where all of the stakeholder interests can be voiced and/or 
represented is paramount to a successful multimillion-dollar acquisition program of any 
nature, joint or not joint. Through the ACTD early user demonstrations, services should 
expect continue to gain all the necessary knowledge of the technological capabilities 
before entering into the formal acquisition timeline. This expectation, in turn, impacted 
the requirements and created a firm basis for which all could argue and defend a position. 
Though some may begrudge the JCIDS process and all that it entails, it was an effective 
process born and implemented in time to positively impact the inception of the JHSV 
program. 
As the Army and Navy position themselves to bridge cultural differences and 
differences in doctrinal operational missions and employment, particularly for the JHSV 
or a like solution, it is recommended that programs be modified only to an extent that 
allows the objective system to be built to meet Army-centric operational maneuver and 
logistics sustainment requirements. This recommendation is critical to reducing 
bureaucratic procedures and maintaining programmatic flexibility. The deviation from 
the initial manning or crewing plans for both the Army and Navy variants is one such 
example where this recommendation applies. 
An additional recommendation is to continue and accelerate similar joint 
programs. This recommendation aligns with the DOD Interim Instruction to streamline, 
where possible, acquisition procedures to achieve program objectives more efficiently. 
This instruction should not compromise the requirements process and its mandates. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite early and continuous challenges in determining, selecting, and prioritizing 
joint requirements, I consider the JHSV program to be a successful joint program. That 
determination is made, in part, on how well the IPT managed its way through a quandary 
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of problems to get to its current endstate, where a significant number of additional vessels 
have been budgeted for procurement. The TSV ACTD and the subsequent JHSV program 
are success stories and proofs of principle that clearly add value to our ability to produce 
and provide materiel solutions. ACTDs contributed a streamlined process to the defense 
acquisition framework and timelines. 
From the Army perspective, the intraservice struggles to determine and prioritize 
the JHSV’s use as a logistics platform or a maneuver platform were painful but essential 
to the final outcome. The logisticians, namely the transporters, were adamant about the 
value and improved effectiveness that JHSV would bring to the Army’s ability to 
enhance its maneuver and logistics support capabilities. Therefore, in conjunction with 
the Army Product Manager for Army Watercraft, a vigorous campaign to exercise those 
capabilities was set in motion. Although the operational control of the vessel essentially 
remains with the Navy via the MSC as a logistics platform, the capabilities of payload 
speed and agility are welcome by commanders as combat multipliers. 
The requirements process and all its implications are applicable to all services and 
their peculiarities. The ORD, used to support and develop the Army’s vision of a 
converted high-speed commercial vessel in its technology demonstrations, was not vetted 
with the other services initially. There was no previous requirement to do so. The 
evolution of the Mission Element Needs Statement to the Mission Needs Statement 
(based on singular service requirements) to the series of documents under JCIDS 
represents an effective approach that must continue to improve through the advent of 
more joint operations and the procurements that support them through the defense 
acquisition process. The joint requirements process and the end results it is designed to 
produce are more than economic matters dictated by shrinking budgets and a mandate to 
be a smaller and lethal joint force of the future. Since 1971, there have been no less than 
14 revisions to the Defense Acquisition Processes described in the DOD 5000 series. 
More changes were scheduled to occur the summer of 2015. The requirements process on 
which our acquisition processes are linked must continue to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency in what we produce and how. 
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The program continuation with additional purchases can also be attributed to the 
program success. Key points of the JHSV program are provided as follows along with a 
projected schedule of vessels that have been or are scheduled to be delivered. The first 
ship delivered to the Army is shown at Figure 8. According to Wikipedia: 
The fleet of vessels have since been renamed the Spearhead-class EFP. 
• On 2 May 2011, all Army JHSVs were transferred to the Navy.
• On 5 December 2012, the first ship in the class, USNS Spearhead
(Figure 10), was delivered to MSC in Mobile, Alabama.
• On June 2011, Austal was awarded construction contracts for EPF-6 and
EPF-7.
• On 27 February 2012, Austal was awarded construction contracts for EPF-
8 and EPF-9.
• On 10 December 2012, the Navy awarded its final option under its current
contract and ordered EPF-1.
• On 5 April 2013, the EPF program was added to the remit of the Littoral
Combat Ship Council so that the capabilities of both ship types could be
considered together.
• In 2014, the USN considered outsourcing the management of the fleet, but
concluded that the ships would continue to be manned by CIVMARs.
The list of ships launched or contracted for delivery is as follows. 
• USNS Spearhead (T-EPF-1)—In service
• USNS Choctaw County (T-EPF-2)—In service
• USNS Millinocket (T-EPF-3)—In service
• USNS Fall River (T-EPF-4)—In service
• USNS Trenton (T-EPF-5)—In service
• USNS Brunswick (T-EPF-6)—Launched
• USNS Carson City (T-EPF-7)—Launched
• USNS Yuma (T-EPF-8)—Under construction
• USNS Bismarck (T-EPF-9)—On order
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• USNS Burlington (T-EPF-10)—On order 
The Navy is expected to purchase 23 EPF vessels over 30 years. 
(Spearhead-Class Expeditionary Fast Transport, 2016).  
 
Figure 8.  The JHSV Spearhead launched in April 2012. Source: Spearhead-
Class Expeditionary Fast Transport (2016). 
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